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2Abstract
In 2000 Nicholas J. Mackintosh (2000) published an article in Nature referring to 
the concept of general intelligence (“g”) claiming that there is clear empirical 
evidence for the existence of the g factor and psychologists are “…united in their 
support of g”. Surprisingly, his view remained yet unchallenged although this issue 
is by no means as clear-cut as Mackintosh argues. Let us therefore attempt to clarify 
some common but unfortunately major misconceptions about g, which Mackintosh, 
following Jensen’s (1998) precedent, recounted in his Nature article. The bottom 
line is that Spearman’s g does not exist, that this has been known and acknowledged 
by leading scholars (Guttman, 1992; Thurstone, 1947) of factor analysis for decades 
so that the task of objectively defining human intelligence remains unfinished.
General intelligence, “g”, was first postulated by Charles Spearman in 1904 (Spearman, 
1904). It has been debated for more than a century and is without a doubt one of the most 
important concepts of psychology. The crucial question is whether there really is a 
general intelligence in Spearman's sense, a single unidimensional trait, underlying all 
intelligence test performances. In Nature Mackintosh answered this question in the 
affirmative, concluding that: “…psychometricians were united in their support of g, or 
general intelligence” (Mackintosh, 2000) . Indeed, Jensen’s (1998) redefinition of g
which Mackintosh echoes as the first principal component of IQ test scores fulfils none of 
the stringent requirements of Spearman's g as we will see in the following.
Spearman postulated one general intelligence factor underlying the performances of all 
ability tests together with a specific factor unique to each test. The empirical 
consequences of his conceptualization of g are rather demanding, but this should not 
really come as a surprise, once one realizes how strong the necessary condition for g to 
exist actually is. In addition to positive test intercorrelations, the correlations matrix must 
also satisfy a second, very strong condition; namely that all tetrad differences (so-called 
off-diagonal second order minors) are zero. Then, in terms of these partial correlations, 
3Spearman’s g only exists if all partial correlations (with g held constant) reduce 
statistically significant to zero. Numerous data sets exist which clearly violate this strong 
condition (Guttman, 1992).
Moreover, even if this double condition were met for any particular correlation matrix, 
this still would not confirm the existence of g because Spearman’s conception of general 
intelligence was to explain the positive correlations among all intelligence tests, not just 
those of any particular battery of tests. Although initially there appeared to be some 
empirical support that Spearman’s condition might be satisfied for small test batteries, his 
hypothesis of a general factor was soon falsified when larger test batteries were analyzed 
(Spearman, 1932). Even Spearman himself (1932) came to realize that g did not explain 
all correlations between tests. Instead, additional, so-called group factors (logical, 
mechanical, psychological and arithmetical abilities) were needed to depress the partial 
correlations to statistically acceptable small values – tantamount to the refutation of 
Spearman’s g.
Mackintosh follows the precedent of Jensen (1998), asserting that g is equivalent to the 
first principal component in a factor analysis: “This ‘positive manifold’ means that factor 
analysis always yield a large general factor”(Mackintosh, 2000) (emphasis added). But 
this is always true for any first principal component (PC1); true in the sense that it is a 
mathematical tautology; but not true for the existence of g. The existence of any PC1, 
mathematically defined as the linear combination of the observed variables which has 
largest variance among all linear combinations (subject to the constraint that the weight 
vector has unit length) is tautologically true, and hence can not be an empirical discovery. 
Moreover, Spearman made no claims how “large” g is or should be. Rather, he claimed 
its existence must satisfy the tetrad difference equations. If one permits extraction of 
more than one principal components, then they (2, 3 or more components) will always 
account for the largest proportion of the variances of the observed variables, again by 
virtue of a mathematical tautology in the sense of explaining as much variance as 
possible. Therefore it is not legitimate for Mackintosh to infer “…the existence of the 
general factor g, extracted by factor analysis of any IQ-test battery”(Mackintosh, 2000) 
on the basis that the PC1 accounts for the largest proportion of the observed variance – it 
4must. Mackintosh is correct only to the extent that a large general factor cannot be made 
to disappear because no statistical legerdemain can make a mathematical tautology 
disappear.
Jensen (1998) and his followers often argue that the identity of different PC1s extracted 
from different batteries are the same, even if they do not satisfy the tetrad difference 
condition, because the two regression weight vectors of the PC1’s are usually very 
similar. This reasoning confuses random variables with distribution parameters. With the 
same logic one could argue that the variables are the same if their variances are the same. 
The equality of regression weight vectors tells absolutely nothing about equality of PC1s. 
Consider two sets of p variables each, where all variables in the first set are perfectly 
uncorrelated with all variables in the second set, but both within-set correlation matrices 
are equal:
R 0
0 R
 
  
If we extract the PC1 in each set, then we will obtain two identical columns of regression 
weights, but the PC1s of both batteries correlate zero.
Summarizing the critique in terms of common logic, let us see what went wrong in 
Mackintosh’s argumentation: For each scientific proposition it is important to distinguish 
between hypotheses, tautologies, and meaningless statements. To illustrate these 
fundamental distinctions, consider the following three statements:
Theorem 1: The PC1 always explains the most of the variance due to its mathematical 
definition. This is well defined and true.
Theorem 2: There is single unidimensional trait g, underlying all intelligence tests 
performances so that the partial correlations are zero after holding g constant. This is well 
defined and false.
Theorem 3: There is a linear combination of the original variables, called PC1. This is 
well defined and true, but tautological.
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meaningless statement as long as intelligence is empirically undefined.
In order to define intelligence objectively and to make his claim falsifiable Spearman 
stated a testable hypothesis which turned out to be false, i.e., theorem 2.
On the other hand, while trying to salvage a falsified theory by tendentiously redefining g
as the first principal component (theorem 1), Mackintosh, among others, misrepresented a 
perfectly clear and falsifiable theory into various methods for data reduction with 
tautological conclusions (theorem 3), and discusses the characteristics of a still undefined 
variable (theorem 4). He talks as if he were dealing with theorem 2, thereby concluding 
that a false statement is true.
Finally, one is left with a misconception of a falsifiable hypothesis where a mere 
mathematical tautology, inherent in the structure of all positive test inter-correlations, is 
used to provide confirming “evidence”.
Ironically, one of the main proponents of factorial intelligence theory, John Horn (2007), 
has late in life resigned himself to the plain fact that: “A wide array of evidence from 
research on development, education, neurology and genetics suggests that it is unlikely 
that a factor general to all abilities regarded as indicating intelligence produces individual 
differences variability. (…). These efforts have all failed to alter the conclusion that no 
general factor has been found. The evidence suggests that if there were such a factor, it 
would account for no more than a miniscule part of the variance in human intellectual 
abilities”.
The logic of science tells us that before one describes and accounts the characteristics of 
a thing, one must show that it really exists. Otherwise it remains a myth (Shalizi, 2007).
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